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207 
IN DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REPUBLICANISM: A REPLY TO 
CRITICISMS OF OUR REPUBLICAN 
CONSTITUTION 
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING 
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth). 
Randy E. Barnett1 
I am supremely grateful to the University of Illinois College 
of Law’s Program in Constitutional Theory, History, and Law, 
directed by my friend Kurt Lash, and to Constitutional 
Commentary and its editor Jill Hasday, for the honor of convening 
and publishing this symposium on my book, Our Republican 
Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the 
People.2 I am also enormously appreciative to the authors of the 
papers that appear in this volume: Jud Campbell, Jack Balkin, 
Jason Mazzone, Amy Coney Barrett, Sanford Levinson, and my 
colleague Lawrence Solum. Their commentaries are uniformly 
insightful, constructive, and stimulating. They have caused me to 
think more deeply about the many issues they have raised—so 
many issues that this reply can only touch on the highlights. 
Rather than attempt to be comprehensive, I aim instead to use 
their critiques as a springboard to clarify the claims I make in Our 
 
 1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center 
for the Constitution. An early version of these remarks were presented at the “Symposium 
on Our Republican Constitution,” which was held at the University of Illinois College of 
Law, in Champaign, Illinois on March 18, 2016. The symposium was jointly-sponsored by 
Illinois’ Program in Constitutional Theory, History, and Law, and the Georgetown Center 
for the Constitution. Permission to reprint or distribute this essay for nonprofit educational 
purposes is hereby granted. 
 2. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). 
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Republican Constitution and, where possible, to look for common 
ground. 
JUD CAMPBELL 
There is much to admire and like in Jud Campbell’s article 
Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding.3 I found his 
treatment of Founding Era sources discussing natural rights and 
social contractarianism to be nuanced and fascinating. And I 
agree with large swaths of what he says. Where I may disagree, 
however, would require an exegesis of Founding Era sources that 
would necessitate a deeper dive into those sources than I am 
prepared to make or could present here if I was. So let me confine 
myself to two points he may want to think about for his future 
work, and a general observation about the qualified nature of his 
thesis. 
First, while he admirably presents a wide diversity of sources 
in a remarkably coherent way, he never attempts to resolve some 
of the fundamental differences in approaches to which he alludes. 
While I share his view that, when it came to first principles, the 
Founding generation agreed on much and that their 
disagreements should not be exaggerated, disagree they did: 
especially on the scope of the implied powers of the federal 
government. That was what the debate over the first bank was all 
about. 
And yet, at the end of his paper, Campbell is seemingly able 
to reach a unitary conclusion regarding their views of the status of 
natural rights. As he concludes, “[m]ost retained natural rights 
were therefore individual rights that could be collectively defined 
and exercised by legislatures, with virtually no room for judicial 
oversight. In the end, Founding-Era natural rights were not really 
‘rights’ at all . . . .”4 I think his conclusion is a little too confident, 
even in light of the discourse he so admirably summarizes, but also 
in light of some items he does not mention. 
I will limit myself to one set of statements from Madison. In 
a footnote of his essay, Campbell quotes Madison’s Bill of Rights 
speech where he said that “it is for [Congress] to judge of the 
 
 3. Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. 
COMMENT. 85 (2016). 
 4. Id. at 111–12. 
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necessity and propriety” of laws.5 And Madison does make this 
statement in the context of discussing why certain means—like 
the use of general warrants as a means of raising revenue—should 
be restricted by adding certain positive rights, which Campbell 
calls “constitutional rights.” Here, the end of “raising revenue” is 
undoubtedly a proper one as it was enumerated. 
Yet, in his bank speech delivered to that very same Congress, 
Madison invokes the Ninth Amendment “as guarding against a 
latitude of interpretation”6 of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
with respect to whether a monopoly grant to a bank was properly 
within the power of Congress. One possible way to reconcile these 
positions is that, as these statements were made during a 
congressional debate, whether or not a monopoly is “proper” is 
solely for the Congress to debate and decide, and not for the 
courts. 
Years later, however, in a letter to Spencer  Roane 
responding to Chief Justice  Marshall’s  opinion  in  McCulloch 
upholding the National Bank Act that Madison had signed into 
law as president, Madison  condemned  “the  high sanction  given  
to  a  latitude in expounding the  Constitution,” and  in particular 
to “a legislative discretion” as to the means “to which no practical 
limit  can  be  assigned.”7 And  he  then  expressly  criticized  
Marshall  for  his assertion of  judicial  restraint: “Does  not  the  
court  also  relinquish,  by  their doctrine, all control on the 
legislative exercise of unconstitutional  powers?” Equating 
“necessity” with mere convenience, wrote Madison, would place 
the matter “beyond the reach of judicial cognizance. . . . By what 
handle could the court take hold of the case?”8 
So Madison apparently saw an important role for courts in 
holding Congress to its enumerated powers—a role so important 
that it could be cited against an interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause that was not judicially administrable. And he 
took issue with Marshall’s reasoning on this question in a case that 
reached an outcome with which he agreed! 
Further, it is revealing  that,  when  Marshall  later  sought  in  
his  series  of pseudonymous newspaper essays to defend himself 
 
 5. See id. at 108, n. 113 (quoting James Madison). 
 6. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (Rep. J. Madison). 
 7. Letter from James Madison to Judge Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS & 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, at 143 (New York, R. Worthington 1884). 
 8. Id. at 144. 
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from this charge, he denied (perhaps disingenuously) equating 
“necessary” with “convenience”: “The court does not say that the 
word ‘necessary’ means whatever may be ‘convenient,’ or 
‘useful.’”9 He then specifically rejects the view that the Court 
should have exercised judicial restraint or “modesty” and 
deferred to Congress’s own assessment of the scope of its powers: 
Would Amphyction himself be content with the declaration of 
the Supreme Court that, on any question concerning the 
constitutionality of the act, It is enough to say “it is not 
consistent with judicial modesty” to contradict the opinion of 
Congress, and “thus to arrogate to themselves the right of 
putting their veto upon a law”. . .?10 
To the contrary, Marshall maintained, it “was incumbent on them 
to state their real opinion and their reasons for it.”11 
In a later essay, Marshall doubled down on the Court’s 
assertion that it would fall to the judiciary to assess whether 
Congress was exercising an enumerated power in good faith, or is 
instead acting pretexually: 
In no single instance does the court admit the unlimited power 
of congress to adopt any means whatever, and thus to pass the 
limits prescribed by the Constitution. Not only is the discretion 
claimed for the legislature in the selection of its means, always 
limited in terms, to such as are appropriate, but the court 
expressly says, “should congress under the pretext of executing 
its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects, not 
entrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty 
of this tribunal . . . to say that such was not the law of the land.12 
Marshall also implicated the concept of good faith in defense 
of using “convenient” as a synonym for “necessary”: “When so 
used, they signify neither a feigned convenience nor a strict 
 
 9. John Marshall, A Friend to the Union, PHILA. UNION, Apr. 28, 1819, reprinted in 
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 100 (Gerald Gunther ed., 
1969). This seems a positively bizarre claim in light of McCulloch’s oft-quoted passage: 
“the word ‘necessary’ . . . frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or 
useful, or essential to another.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 
(1819). Any attempt to reconcile these statements is beyond the scope of this reply. 
 10.  Marshall, A Friend to the Union (Apr. 28, 1819), in GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 
105. 
 11. Id. 
 12. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 5, 
1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 100 
(Gerald Gunther ed.,1969) 186–87. 
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necessity; but a reasonable convenience, and a qualified 
necessity . . . .”13 
A judicial willingness to invalidate pretextual assertions of 
power for the common good is exactly what I am advocating in 
Our Republican Constitution (pp. 231-245). While I would not 
want to place too much weight on particular statements by 
Madison, Marshall, or anyone else, I think the matter of the 
judicial role in holding legislatures to their “just powers” was, at 
minimum, more contestable, or at least in flux, at the founding 
than Campbell’s unqualified conclusion seems to assert. 
My second point concerns the role that the concept of 
“presumed consent” played in discussions of consent, which 
Campbell addresses only in passing. For me, this was a key 
discovery that I believe has long been overlooked in discussions 
of the role played by natural rights in limiting legislative power. 
As Justice Samuel Chase explained in Calder, the only way 
implied consent of the individual to legislative power can be 
“presumed” or deemed to be unanimous, is if legislatures of 
general powers are limited by the unenumerated “great first 
principles.”14 For example, a law “that punished a citizen for an 
innocent action,” or “a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful 
private contracts of citizens,” or “a law that makes a man a Judge 
in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it 
to B” is merely an “ACT of the legislature (for I cannot call it a 
law).”15 
Why not?  Given the consent of the governed to legislatures 
of general powers, why are such “acts” not “laws”?  Because, said 
Chase, “[i]t is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust 
a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be 
presumed that they have done it.”16 In other words, because the 
unanimous consent of the people is merely “presumed,” such 
consent is by its nature limited, even without expressed limitations 
on powers being included in a written constitution. 
In a like manner did Attorney General Edmund Randolph 
use such reasoning to conclude that a national bank was beyond 
the power of Congress to enact. In his opinion to President 
 
 13. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). 
 14. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 15. Id. at 388. 
 16. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Washington, Randolph contended that even a textually 
unqualified grant of legislative power “does not affect any of 
those paramount rights, which a free people cannot be supposed 
to confide even to their representatives.”17 
In short, the fact that the consent of each individual can, at 
best, only be presumed provides a limit on the powers that can be 
claimed by legislatures who presume to govern on his or her 
behalf. Although the role that judges may play in enforcing such 
a limit is a separate question, the inherently bounded nature of 
presumed consent is an important conceptual prerequisite to the 
judicial duty to nullify ultra-vires statutes. 
Finally, Campbell couches his critique carefully in ways that 
make it more difficult to rebut, but also potentially consistent with 
the portrait of natural rights and presumed consent that I present 
in Our Republican Constitution. Here are a few examples (with 
my emphases added): 
In short, natural rights called for good government, not 
necessarily less government.18 
Inalienability undergirded the American stance about who 
could collect taxes and regulate property, but labeling 
something as a “natural right” did not suggest well-defined 
limitations on governmental power.19 
By contrast, retained natural rights did not impose strict limits 
on the powers of representative bodies.20 
[T]he historical record shows that they preserved retained 
natural rights principally through constitutional structure, 
giving legislators, not judges, nearly complete responsibility for 
determining their proper scope.21 
In this way, the Founders’ “anti-democratic” efforts did not 
reflect an understanding of “natural rights” as rigid constraints 
on governmental power.22 
 
 17. Edmund Randolph, Opinion of Edmond Randolph, Attorney General of the 
United States, to President Washington, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 86 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall, ed., 1932) 
(emphasis added). 
 18. Campbell, supra note 3, at 87. 
 19. Id. at 98. 
 20. Id. at 101. 
 21. Id. at 104. 
 22. Id. at 105. 
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The combination of these principles meant that, both in theory 
and in practice, legislatures had virtually unfettered authority 
over most retained natural rights.23 
Campbell is to be commended for his care in formulating 
these conclusions from the evidence he presents. But the 
qualifiers he employs leave much room for judges to have some 
role in curbing legislators who exceed what the Declaration of 
Independence referred to as their “just powers.” 
True, natural rights may not have been thought to provide 
“rigid” restraints on legislative power, or be legally enforceable as 
such. I do not claim otherwise in Our Republican Constitution. 
But the continued existence of such rights after the formation of 
civil society—which Campbell acknowledges that some, if not 
most, of the Founders believed—nevertheless can justify some 
outer boundary on the powers of legislatures to restrict the 
liberties of the people—even if such limitations were neither 
“strict” nor “well defined.” 
What then is the proper role of the judiciary in a 
constitutional republic in which the people retain their natural 
rights? Campbell tells us that “the historical record shows that 
they preserved retained natural rights principally through 
constitutional structure. . . .”24 In Our Republican Constitution, I 
propose that judges are needed to ensure that this structure is 
preserved—in particular the limitations on federal power that 
defines the reserved powers of the states (in chapters 6 and 7), and 
the separation of powers within the federal government (in 
chapter 8). Presumably, Campbell has no objection in principle to 
these types of judicially-enforceable limits on legislative power as 
a means of protecting the natural rights retained by the people. 
Only in Chapter 9 do I discuss another outer boundary on 
legislative power: no individual can be presumed to have 
consented to their liberty being restricted by irrational and 
arbitrary edicts, which cannot properly be considered to be laws. 
Of course, where one draws the line on what is irrational and 
arbitrary is not always obvious (though sometimes it is pretty 
clear, as Sandy Levinson concedes25), and we can employ various 
presumptions to reach results in actual litigation. But it seems 
 
 23. Id. at 108. 
 24. Id. at 104. 
 25. See infra text accompanying note 70. 
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plain from Calder and other sources that the judiciary had some 
role to play in protecting the individual sovereign from his agents 
acting towards him in such a manner. 
True, the abstract nature of natural rights themselves do not 
specify which restrictions do not serve the common good because 
they are irrational or arbitrary. What is needed is constitutional 
law or implementing doctrine to cash out these limits in a 
judicially-administrable way. In Chapter 9, I propose that, as was 
suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
we are looking to smoke out “pretexual” assertions of power that 
were actually enacted to serve the interests of the few over the 
common good of everyone (pp. 231-245). 
I do not propose, however, that courts directly examine the 
motives of legislators. Instead, I suggest they approach laws with 
a “realistic” appreciation that statutes and regulations are not 
always enacted in good faith, but are often enacted to dispense 
benefits to a selected few, or even many, at the expense of 
others—as well as other objectives that are beyond the just 
powers of any republican legislature. For example, restrictions on 
liberty are also enacted simply because legislators do not approve 
of the liberty being exercised. 
Moreover, at the founding it might have been reasonable to 
assume that legislators might deliberate about the constitutional 
scope of their powers—as the first Congress did when debating a 
national bank—a deliberation of which judges might well be 
respectful. Today, however, if legislators pay any attention to the 
Constitution at all—and they typically pay none—they merely 
debate whether or not the courts will uphold their acts. When 
courts, in turn, are deferring to legislatures about the scope of 
their own powers, while legislatures are deferring to the court’s 
willingness to uphold their laws, we have what I call the problem 
of “double deference,” where no one is assuring that legislatures 
are remaining within their just powers (pp. 128-129). 
When devising implementing doctrine, courts should be 
mindful of this reality. I propose that, to protect the rights 
retained by the people, judges should require legislatures to 
articulate the proper end they seek to accomplish—a seemingly 
reasonable demand—and then examine the fit between the means 
adopted and the stated end. And simply helping out a favored 
interest group at the expense of either a minority of the people or 
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the people as a whole is not a proper end of a legislature in a 
republic in which the people themselves retain their natural rights. 
By the same token, where different persons are being treated 
differentially, courts should ask how this differential treatment of 
individuals or groups is justified. What judges should not do, I 
maintain, is adopt highly unrealistic and formalist “presumptions” 
in favor of legislative power that cannot be rebutted by any 
argument or evidence presented by a member of the sovereign 
people to an independent and neutral magistrate. 
In this way, irrationality and arbitrariness review provides an 
outer boundary or guard rails within which legislatures are 
entirely free to regulate the exercise of natural rights or liberty in 
good faith for the common good. Such an outer boundary of good 
faith would seem to fall within the qualifiers that Campbell 
attaches to the discretion he says legislatures were thought to have 
at the founding: It is not “rigid,” it does not “necessarily” lead to 
“less government,” and it “principally” relies on reinforcing the 
structure of our Republican Constitution. 
But this approach does deny that legislatures have “complete 
responsibility for determining” the proper scope of their 
delegated powers or that, as servants, they have “unfettered 
authority” over the retained liberties of their masters. In short, 
such an approach seeks to effectuate what Campbell accurately 
calls “the philosophical pillars of republican government.” 
JACK BALKIN 
Jack is entirely right. This is not an originalist book.26 If it had 
been, I would have used evidence in an entirely different way. But 
neither is it an historical work that purports to capture the full 
meaning of “republicanism.” Rather it is an antidote; an antidote 
to an overly-democratic reading of the Constitution and our 
“ethos” while imputing that reading and ethos back to the 
Founding. (In contrast, it is to Sandy Levinson’s great credit that 
he has always had the intellectual integrity to describe the 
Constitution as it is, and not as he would like it to be, and then to 
judge it accordingly.) 
 
 26. See Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 32 CONST. COMM. 38 
(2016). 
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For this reason, focusing solely on the “undemocratic” and 
even “antidemocratic” aspect of “republicanism”—while setting 
to one side the anti-monarchical or anti-aristocratic aspects of 
republicanism—has great value. So too is forgoing discussion of 
the other eight features he identifies with “classical 
republicanism” to focus on one persistent tension that runs from 
the Founding up to the present: the tension between “popular 
government” to secure the rights of the people and democratic 
majoritarianism that can undermine these rights. It is this tension 
that Madison set out to examine in his Vices essay.27 
That this was not the only issue confronting the Founders, the 
generations between them and us, or that confronts us today does 
not make it any less important to identify and focus on this single 
issue. I chose to do so because it is this issue—as opposed to the 
other aspects of republicanism that Balkin identifies—that 
underlies much of our present-day thinking of the proper role of 
courts. 
I admit my book was written for a popular audience and 
therefore was limited in how nuanced it could be. Ask my editor 
who demanded a complete rewrite after buying the book and 
paying a substantial advance for it. But when they move outside 
their doctrinal sub-specialties, the political theoretic as well as 
historical views of most law professors are pretty much at the level 
of the general public. In my experience, nothing reaches law 
professors more effectively than a treatment that is written to be 
accessible by a first-year law student. 
Of course, this would be a problem if my book gets our 
“ethos” wrong. Balkin suggests mine does, primarily due to sins 
of omission rather than commission, but by sinning nonetheless. 
As might be expected, I disagree. The sharp line Balkin draws 
between “republicanism” and “classical liberalism” may well be 
anachronistic. As Gordon Wood warned, it “is important to 
remember that the boxlike categories of ‘republicanism’ and 
‘liberalism’ are essentially the inventions of us historians, and as 
such they are dangerous if heuristically necessary distortions of a 
very complicated past reality.”28 
 
 27. See pp. 52–58 (discussing Madison’s The Vices of the Political System of the United 
States). 
 28. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 xi 
(2d ed. 1998). 
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When discussing “a complicated past reality,” there is 
nothing wrong with isolating one particular—and selectively 
neglected—feature of that reality. In Our Republican 
Constitution, I focus on the fact that the tension between 
majoritarianism and fundamental rights does go all the way back. 
And what passes for modern notions of majoritarian rule were 
rejected by the Founders when they wrote the text of our 
Constitution. So recapturing this aspect of republicanism is 
independently valuable to supporting a proper appreciation for 
our “undemocratic Constitution,” which is necessary to seeing it 
accurately interpreted and enforced. 
Balkin makes a very useful observation about the 
methodology of the book that is worth quoting at length: 
Although Barnett quotes the Founders at many points in the 
book, his argument is not really an argument about the original 
meaning of the Constitution.  At least, it is not an argument 
from original meaning according to Barnett’s own theory of 
how to interpret the Constitution. That theory distinguishes 
between discovering the original communicative content of the 
Constitution—the task of constitutional interpretation—and 
constitutional “constructions,” which fill out, make sense of, 
and apply the constitutional text. 
Much of the argument of the book is not constitutional 
interpretation in the sense described above, because it is not an 
exegesis of the original communicative content of the text of 
the Constitution. In fact, the document on which Barnett 
lavishes the most attention is the Declaration of Independence, 
and he takes us through several of its key passages with a focus 
that is almost Talmudic in its attentions.  Barnett uses the 
Declaration to elaborate what he regards as the essential ethos 
of the Constitution. According to Barnett’s theory of 
constitutional interpretation, this argument is a construction of 
the Constitution—albeit the best and most appropriate 
construction. Similarly, his “presumption of liberty” is not an 
account of the original communicative content of the 
Constitution’s text. Rather, it is an important construction 
directed at judges and designed to fulfil the Constitution’s 
larger purposes.29 
This is all exactly right. The only “originalist” claim I might 
have made concerns the original public meaning of “We the 
People.” But I do not present enough evidence to establish that 
 
 29. Balkin, supra note 26, at 38. 
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the individualist conception of popular sovereignty I identify was 
the prevailing view. At best, I have shown that it was an available 
view that was sufficiently fundamental and well known—as 
evidenced by its expression in the Declaration of Independence—
to render “We the People” irreducibly ambiguous in this regard 
and therefore in need of construction. 
Balkin then asks, “What kind of argument is Barnett making 
then?”30 I like the answer given by my colleague Larry Solum: “In 
my view, Barnett and his critics are engaging in what philosophers 
of language call ‘metalinguistic negotiation’—the process by 
which the meaning of words like ‘republican’ and phrases like 
‘republican constitutionalism’ are contested (adversarially) or 
negotiated (cooperatively),” the former of which he calls 
“metalinguistic contestation.”31A central aim of Our Republican 
Constitution, he says, “is to engage in metalinguistic contestation 
. . . by articulating a normative constitutional theory and showing 
the connections between that theory and various uses of the words 
‘republican’ and ‘republicanism’ in both American history and 
contemporary constitutional politics.”32 
I believe Solum is right to say that I am “entering into 
contemporary constitutional politics from a perspective rooted in 
constitutional theory and history,” but am speaking “to a 
contemporary audience from a contemporary perspective” by 
means of a “republican narrative”33: “a story about American 
constitutional development that associates [my] normative theory 
of constitutionalism with the idea of a ‘republic’ in the sense in 
which a republic is contrasted with ‘majoritarian democracy.’”34 If 
the argumentative strategy succeeds, “the political identity of 
being a ‘Republican’ [today!] will come to be associated with 
endorsing the ‘republican constitution’ and opposing the 
‘democratic constitution.’”35 
Balkin characterizes my “description of republicanism [as] a 
remarkable act of historiographical chutzpah.”36 To this, Solum 
quite trenchantly responds: 
 
 30. Id. at 39. 
 31. Lawrence B. Solum, Republican Constitutionalism, 32 CONST. COMM. 175, 178 
(2016). 
 32. Id. at 178. 
 33. Id. at 179. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Balkin, supra note 26, at 54. 
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Barnett is not trying to unearth the historical meaning of the 
phrase “republican constitution” in the early republic or 
later—rather, his aim is to engage in metalinguistic 
contestation that creates new meaning for that phrase.  
Structurally, Barnett’s move is similar to the attempt by 
progressive constitutional scholars to associate “civic 
republicanism” with a contemporary progressive constitutional 
theory.37 
Precisely! As I mention below in responding to Sandy 
Levinson, having successfully captured the flag of “civic 
republicanism” in the 1980s for themselves, progressives are 
distressed by any narrative that threatens their ownership of the 
label “republicanism™.”38 
Given all this, Solum finds it unsurprising that I did not 
choose the phrase “Our Liberal Constitution” as the title for his 
book—as I was urged to do by both Balkin and Sandy Levinson 
when they commented on an earlier draft: 
Given the contemporary political valence of the term “liberal,” 
that title would have been counterproductive, a laughable error 
of authorial judgment.  Indeed, it seems unlikely that any 
members of the intended audience for the book would bother 
to read it, if it had that title, whereas a book entitled “Our 
Republican Constitution” might grab their attention.  
Members of the Republican Party will not endorse “Our 
Liberal Constitution”—because the contemporary meaning of 
the word “liberal” in political contexts is diametrically opposed 
to their political commitments.39 
In addition to being right about the fact that my analysis is 
not originalist, Balkin is also right that this is a book about today, 
and that I did not anticipate the rise of Trumpism when I wrote it. 
Indeed, when I began writing the book two years ago, I might 
have imagined a clean electoral battle between a Ted Cruz (or a 
Rand Paul, for whom I worked as a campaign advisor) against a 
Hillary Clinton, in which case, I would have wanted the 
Republican Party’s vision of the Constitution to be superior to 
that of John Roberts’. 
Is this still a worthwhile argument to make in the face of 
Trumpism? I think so, but time of course will tell. Trumpism—
 
 37. Solum, supra note 31, at 178. 
 38. See infra at pp. 18–26. 
 39. Solum, supra note 31, at 178. 
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which is a mixture of Populism and Caesarism—represents about 
35-40% of those who voted in open primaries, which includes a 
lot of Democrats. Under the voting rules put in place by the 
Republican National Committee, perhaps to assist “insider” Jed 
Bush against a divided field of “outsiders,” that plurality turned 
out to be enough to secure the Republican nomination for a 
candidate who had, until recently, been a New York socially-
liberal Democrat reality television personality and relentless self-
promoter. 
Yet a significant part of the Republican Party—call it the 
conservative Republican intelligentsia—was bitterly, and in the 
case of the #NeverTrump folks possibly irredeemably, opposed to 
this remaking of the Republican Party. Perhaps it is no 
coincidence that conservative commentator George Will, who 
wrote the Foreword for Our Republican Constitution, recently 
changed his registration from Republican to unaffiliated.40  
Moreover, in the final chapter, I also recommend an Article 
V convention of the states to propose amendments to restore or 
bolster the republican features of our Constitution that have been 
undermined by the political processes I describe in my book. 
Indeed, eight of the requisite thirty-four state legislatures have 
now called for such a convention, and a simulated Article V 
convention—drawing commissioners from all fifty states—was 
held in Williamsburg, Virginia in September. And, after the 2016 
elections, thirty-three state legislatures are now completely in 
Republican hands. 
Of course, with the election of Trump, I would have expected 
many progressives suddenly to rediscover the “republican” nature 
of our undemocratic Constitution. Given the liberal use of the 
“undemocratic” filibuster by Democrats since they lost control of 
the Senate, this is a pretty safe bet. As Balkin puts it, “Trump is a 
nightmare version of Barnett’s Democratic Constitution, not 
because he is a good-government progressive, but because he is at 
heart a Schmittian.”41 While this seems a reasonable bet, only time 
will tell if Trump governs as he campaigned. But if he does, as with 
the New Dealers who had second thoughts about judicial self-
restraint when the Republicans gained control of Congress in 
 
 40. See Maggie Haberman, George Will Leaves the G.O.P. Over Donald Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/us/politics/george-will-leaves-
the-gop-over-donald-trump.html?_r=0. 
 41. Balkin, supra note 26, at 58. 
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1946, I expect progressives to be less than enthusiastic about a 
Trumpian expression of the Rouseauian General Will that was 
embraced by the Democratic Party in the 1830s, which called itself 
“the Democracy” (pp. 158-160, 87-88). 42 
With the result in 2016, Schmittian Trumpism within the 
Republican Party will need to be dealt with. Either the limited-
government, constitutionist wing prevails, or a new 
“constitutional freedom party” must arise to supplant the 
Republican Party the way the Republicans emerged to replace the 
Whigs. Although the platform of such a party would have much 
more to it than a stance on the Constitution, it would be nice if the 
part that deals with the Constitution echoes the themes of my 
book. 
JASON MAZZONE 
Our Republican Constitution presents an argument about 
how democratic majoritarianism is not the answer to the problem 
of constitutional legitimacy, but the problem that a republican 
constitution is needed to solve. Call it “the majoritarian 
difficulty.” Constitutional limits on government power are one 
way to temper majoritarian abuses of the liberties of We the 
People—each and every one. And these liberties include, but are 
not limited to, the economic liberty to pursue a lawful occupation 
free from irrational or arbitrary restrictions. By enforcing these 
limits, as agents of We the People, judges play an important role 
in legitimating whatever restrictions on liberty survive meaningful 
scrutiny. 
In his pithily-entitled, “Me the People,”43 Jason Mazzone’s 
principal objection to this proposal is that a single Supreme Court 
is not capable of micromanaging a legal system whose doors are 
open to florists, hair braiders, casket-making monks, horse 
massagers, tour guides, and any other member of We the People 
who seeks to earn an honest living in occupations that are not 
inherently unlawful. But I confess that I do not entirely 
understand the complaint. 
 
 42. See also GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: 
FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 39 (2002) (“Van Buren’s concept of democracy was close to 
Rousseau’s”). 
 43. Jason Mazzone, Me the People, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 143 (2016). 
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How much extra work would it have taken for the Supreme 
Court to have refused to grant cert in Lee Optical of Oklahoma 
vs. Williamson44 than to grant cert and rule in Williamson v. Lee 
Optical45? True, that would have left it to other federal district 
courts to take evidence and fairly decide these cases locally, but 
that would seem to be the sort of project they could do—as they 
did do in the case itself—and which Mazzone seems to favor with 
respect to state courts enforcing federal constitutional rights. So 
what’s his beef? 
If the issue is that we don’t have enough lower courts to 
handle the work, he does not say so. My response to this concern 
is the same as Justice Bradley’s retort in his Slaughter-House 
dissent to Justice Miller invoking the specter of a flood of 
litigation to justify his narrow reading of the Privileges or 
Immunities clause: 
[E]ven if the business of the National courts should be 
increased, Congress could easily supply the remedy by 
increasing their number and efficiency. The great question is, 
What is the true construction of the amendment? When once 
we find that, we shall find the means of giving it effect. The 
argument from inconvenience ought not to have a very 
controlling influence in questions of this sort.46 
Or we could free up immeasurable federal court resources simply 
by repealing the Controlled Substances Act. 
Mazzone posits my claim is “that the Republican 
Constitution will be saved if our Supreme Court . . . aggressively 
reviews laws and government action for their rationality.”47 But, 
as I make clear, such review need not be “aggressive”—an issue 
to which I will return when discussing Sandy Levinson’s critique.48 
It just needs to be real, not fictitious; actual, not hypothetical. All 
the sovereign members of We the People want and deserve as 
sovereigns is their day in court in which their judges do not 
reflectively side with their servants over them. 
But I confess that my biggest disappointment with Mazzone’s 
paper is that he fails to deliver on the critique embedded in his 
catchy title, “Me the People.” He seems to let that label do all the 
 
 44. 120 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954). 
 45. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 46. 83 U.S. 36, 124 (1873) (Bradley, J. dissenting). 
 47. Mazzone, supra note 43, at 152 (emphasis added). 
 48. See infra text accompanying notes 94–97. 
9 - BARNETT_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17  9:11 AM 
2017] A REPLY TO SIX CRITICISMS 223 
 
work. “Me” implies a certain selfishness, or even atomistic 
individualism. But I do not deny that legislatures should regulate 
in the public good. I merely claim that this is what they must be 
doing to be consistent with the presumed consent of We the 
People, and sometimes they aren’t. 
Recognizing the individual as the ultimate sovereign is no 
more or less empowering than recognizing monarchs as the 
ultimate sovereign of their nations. Within their own domains 
monarchs are free to exercise their will, as well as to enter into 
compacts or treaties with other monarchs. The law of nations then 
regulates their relations with other sovereigns. 
So, too, in the United States where the people themselves are 
monarchs. They are presumably free to use what is theirs and 
enter into contracts with one another. Domestic law is then there 
to stop them from invading the rights of others and to regulate 
their actions to prevent such wrongs from occurring. 
As I have argued in other places, few progressives would 
outlaw private property or private contracts. Instead, they argue 
that government should do more.49 Whether or not it should to 
more, it seems like a relatively modest proposal, in light of our 
republican heritage—not to mention sound moral theory—to 
include the rights of property and contract among those that are 
to be protected from either majoritarian abuses, or far more 
commonly, abuses by entirely unaccountable regulatory boards 
that are often captured by the very industries they purport to 
regulate—often by legislative design. 
AMY CONEY BARRETT 
Like Jack Balkin, Amy Coney Barrett is entirely right that I 
am not making an originalist case for the Republican versus the 
Democratic constitutions.50 Perhaps an originalist case can be 
made that the public meaning of “We the People” was 
 
 49. See Randy E. Barnett, Afterword: The Libertarian Middle Way, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 
349, 358 (2013) (“[B]ecause proponents of social justice and legal moralism typically 
propose superimposing their schemes onto existing structures of private property and 
freedom of contract, rather than supplanting them altogether, these stances are necessarily 
more ambitious than simply limiting legal coercion to the libertarian core that must still be 
ascertained and enforced.”). 
 50. See Amy Coney Barrett, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 32 CONST. 
COMM. 61, 66 (2016) (“The book is less about what the Constitution’s original public 
meaning requires than about what is normatively attractive.”). 
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individualist, but Jud Campbell’s article shows how challenging it 
would be to establish this. There is one sense, however, in which 
originalism does figure into my analysis: The “republican” 
conception of the Constitution I identify explains and justifies 
certain features of our written Constitution that Levinson and 
others have condemned as “undemocratic.” 
Put another way, if the original meaning of the text of the 
Constitution is undemocratic, the narrative I present helps bolster 
the case for adhering to these features rather than treating them 
like inkblots. It may well be that the very features of our 
Constitution that lead American law professors like Levinson to 
prefer Euro-style parliamentary systems—and recommend them 
to other countries—is what makes the original meaning of our 
Constitution “republican” and therefore good, rather than 
“undemocratic” and therefore bad. 
Barrett begins by focusing on my claim that courts need to 
“realistically assess whether restrictions on liberty were truly 
calculated to protect the health and safety of the general public, 
rather than being the product of ‘other motives’ beyond the just 
powers of a republican legislature.”51 This is necessary, I wrote, 
because “[r]equiring the government to identify its true purpose 
and then show that the means chosen are actually well suited to 
advance that purpose helps to smoke out illicit motives that the 
government is never presumed by a sovereign people to have 
authorized.”52 
To this she responds with a series of questions: 
Barnett’s emphasis on the importance of recovering the 
legislature’s true purpose understates the complexity of 
identifying legislative intent. It is extraordinarily difficult [. . . ] 
for a court to glean what was “really” going on behind the 
scenes of a statute. A legislature is a multimember body, and 
different members may have different motives. Perhaps some 
legislators enacting a ban on filled milk were concerned about 
its health effects and others were beholden to a powerful dairy 
lobby. Whose intent controls? Is such a statute truly calculated 
to promote health and safety or is it the kind of rent-seeking 
statute that rational individual sovereigns would not 
countenance? Do the rent-seeking motives of some legislators 
 
 51. BARNETT, p. 125 (her emphasis) (praising the late-18th and early 19th-century 
courts that took this approach). 
 52. P. 232 (my emphases). 
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corrupt the statute if other legislators act with the public 
welfare in view?53 
Given how I expressed myself in the book, this is a point well 
taken. Despite my assertion that courts should identify the “true 
purpose” of a measure, I do not propose an inquiry into the 
subjective motives of a multimember body like the legislature. 
What I meant—and wish I had stated more precisely—is that 
courts should be cognizant that legislators and regulators 
sometimes, and even often, impose restrictions on the liberties of 
some of the people for reasons other than the protection of the 
health and safety of the public, or some other power they justly 
exercise. 
Instead, elected legislatures and unelected regulators alike 
sometimes invoke the health and safety of the public as a pretext 
for channeling special benefits and privileges to a politically well-
connected few. As Barrett notes, in the book, I give several 
examples. Indeed, most of the most famous constitutional cases 
about economic regulation involve measures enacted for such 
illicit reasons. 
What I propose is that when restrictions on the liberties of 
We the People are challenged, courts should be realistic rather 
than formalist about the possibility that such laws were enacted 
for what Justice Rufus Peckham described as “other motives.”54 
But this is a conclusion he reached not by inquiring directly into 
the motives of New York state legislators, but after realistically 
assessing and debunking the purported health and safely rationale 
for a maximum hours laws just for bakeshop employees—but 
neither the bake shop employers who worked in the same 
conditions nor employees in other occupations with comparable 
working conditions. 
So, rather than inquire into the subjective motives of 
legislators, courts should require that legislatures commit 
themselves to a proper end they claim to be achieving, and then 
assess whether the means chosen to meet that end were 
“irrational” or “arbitrary.” Although courts do not do so now, it 
is not too much to ask legislatures to include the purpose for their 
measures in the enactment itself, rather than rely on lawyers to 
 
 53. Barrett, supra note 50, at 70 (footnotes omitted). 
 54. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
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make up the purposes after the fact in litigation, as courts 
currently permit. 
Then, courts should examine whether the means chosen 
bears a sufficient relation to the stated end. This is an inquiry that 
courts make routinely in cases involving judicially-favored 
“fundamental rights” or “suspect classes” of persons.55 Again, in 
the book, I provide examples of this inquiry in practice, including 
the lower court opinion in Lee Optical v.Williamson. And I 
contrast this with the Court’s uncritical deference to legislative 
assertions of public purpose in Bradwell v. Illinois56 and Plessy v. 
Ferguson.57 
The search for sufficient means-ends fit is simply too 
common a judicial inquiry to be dismissed as impractical for some 
liberties and but not for others. The reason for disparate 
treatment of different liberties is due to a judicial determination 
that some liberties are more worthy of judicial protection than 
others. Those who, like Barrett, question placing one’s “faith in 
courts” need to explain why judges get to choose some rights as 
“fundamental” and some classifications as “suspect” but not 
others. 
Denying a judicial duty to hold legislatures to within their just 
powers in all cases or in no cases would eliminate the reliance on 
judicial discretion to identify which rights and liberties deserve 
protection. But putting one’s “faith in judges” to choose 
meaningful scrutiny in some cases, and fictitious “rational basis” 
scrutiny in others, is inconsistent with a professed skepticism of 
the “institutional capacity” of judges. I do not see how you can 
have it both ways. 
Barrett characterizes “the normal functioning of the 
legislative process” this way: 
The legislature is not an idealized body that acts with one mind, 
but a multimember body that produces legislation through a 
complex and even chaotic process.  Any bill that runs the gamut 
of this process represents compromises made along the way, 
sometimes to resolve the competing desires of different 
 
 55. See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008). 
 56. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
 57. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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constituencies and sometimes because the legislature has 
drawn a line somewhere.58 
But “resolving the competing desires of different 
constituencies” is not, standing alone, a proper legislative purpose 
in a constitutional republic in which the liberties of each and every 
person merits protection. To this description of the “complex and 
even chaotic process,” Barrett might have added that bills are 
very often written by industry representatives for staffers, and 
then are logrolled past legislators who typically know nothing of 
their contents. 
Without transparency, how are we supposed to know 
whether these “compromises” among the “competing desires of 
different constituencies” are proper or improper? In a 
constitutional republic in which We the People are the ultimate 
sovereign, the persons who are on the coercive end of such 
“compromises” have a right to know. And the due process of law 
requires them to have the opportunity to contest the necessity and 
propriety of such compromises before a neutral magistrate. 
Nor are legislators realistically “accountable” for most of 
what they do. No legislator has ever been defeated because they 
voted for a licensing bill that irrationally or arbitrarily restricted 
the liberty of Americans to braid hair, arrange flowers or 
furniture, make caskets, or drive a limo. And this is not because 
such restrictions have been approved by the general public. It is 
because the electorate is ignorant of these acts, has insufficient 
interest in them to care, and is only allowed to choose between 
two competing parties, each of whom favors an amalgam of 
policies, only a handful of which are particularly salient (pp. 176-
178).59 
In light of this, to imagine that these liberties are somehow 
“balanced” in the legislative process by legislators who are held 
to account by the voters is to engage in magical thinking. The only 
time where legislators do consider the constitutionality of their 
actions is when restricting a right such as the freedom of speech 
that the courts will protect. Only when legislators know that 
individual citizens may challenge their actions in court and judges 
 
 58. Barrett, supra note 50, at 73. 
 59. See also ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY 
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013). 
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will be looking over their shoulders do they even discuss the 
question of a measure’s constitutionality. 
In every other area, legislators employ the artifice of “double 
deference”: Courts will defer to the legislature’s assertion of 
power and then, when asked if what they do is constitutional, 
legislators say “yes, because the courts will uphold us” (pp. 128-
29). This is as big a fraud on the public as anything that economic 
regulation is supposed to prevent. 
Barrett asks a very good question: “Would Prigg, Dred Scott, 
and Plessy have come out differently if courts had only applied 
the standard Barnett proposes? Was it really a misguided 
attachment to judicial restraint that drove those cases, or did the 
Court see through the same discriminatory lens as the 
legislature?”60 To answer this, consider three cases. 
The first is the Slaughter-House Cases61 where there was an 
extensive record in the Louisiana legislature that the slaughter-
house bill was a good faith public health measure.62 The only 
constitutional issue was whether a monopoly given to a private 
company was an appropriate means of pursuing a legitimate 
legislative purpose. But after the Supreme Court’s ruling refusing 
to recognize the right to pursue a lawful occupation as protected 
from state abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
entire legislative record was constitutionally irrelevant. Although 
the majority in Slaughter-House cited this record, the law would 
have been equally constitutional without a single witness being 
sworn. 
You need not take my word for this. The proof is that the 
very next day, in Bradwell v. Illinois,63 the Court relied on its 
ruling in Slaughter-House to turn away Myra Bradwell’s claim 
that denying her the right to practice law was arbitrary or 
irrational. And the Court did so without any examination into the 
irrationality or arbitrariness of this restriction. True, three of the 
dissenters in Slaughter-House concurred in the judgment.64 So 
Barrett is correct to suggest that, for these three justices, the 
 
 60. Barrett, supra note 50, at 79 (footnotes omitted). 
 61. 83 U.S. 36, 124 (1872). 
 62. See Randy E. Barnett, The Three Narratives of Slaughter-House, 41 J. SUP. CT. 
HIST. 295 (2016). 
 63. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
 64. Id. at 139 (Bradley, J. concurring). 
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outcome would have been the same under the standard that I 
propose. 
But, unlike Justice Miller, Justice  Bradley  was  forced  to  
explain  why  Myra’s exclusion  was  not arbitrary, and the reasons 
he articulated provided women’s rights advocates with a rallying 
cry. In contrast, according to the majority’s approach, a court 
need not even inquire into the basis of the law. So, while the case 
would likely have come out the same under either approach, with 
mine, Myra Bradwell had a chance of success. And, even if she 
lost, the court’s reasoning could have been criticized and used as 
a basis for change in the future. 
Furthermore, in Bradwell, Chief Justice Chase dissented not 
only from Miller’s majority opinion but “from all the opinions” in 
the case,65 including Justice Bradley’s. Even in 1873, when 
opinions of women were highly sexist, the Chief Justice would 
have upheld Myra Bradwell’s challenge as an irrational or 
arbitrary restriction on her right to pursue a lawful occupation. 
So, under the standard I propose, one justice would have reached 
a different result. 
In Plessy, the Court asserted that: “[W]e cannot say that a 
law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two 
races in public conveyances is unreasonable.”66 Most likely, like 
the majority in Bradwell, they would have upheld segregation 
regardless of what record was developed below. But relying on 
Slaughter-House, the Court needed no such record to reach its 
conclusion. Consequently, the Court did not even have to 
consider whether the state’s claim to be preserving the public 
order was plausible. How convenient for them. The judicial 
restraint of the Democratic Constitution took them completely 
out of the picture. 
As with Chief Justice Chase’s dissent in Bradwell, in Plessy, 
the more realistic assessment of this exercise of the police power 
justified a solo dissent by Justice Harlan. So here too, the different 
standard made a difference; the difference between a unanimous 
decision and one accompanied by a contemporaneous dissenting 
opinion to explain to the public and posterity why the majority 
was wrong. 
 
 65. Id. at 142 (Chase, C.J., dissenting). 
 66. 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896). 
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The fact that such a law would get scrutiny today shows that 
courts are quite capable of supplying it. So, where there is the will 
to ensure that the liberty of We the People is not irrationally or 
arbitrarily restricted, there is a way—provided that courts 
appreciate their essential role as servants of the sovereign people, 
including individual citizens like Myra Bradwell and Homer 
Plessy. 
Finally, like other authors, Barrett mentions my 
“presumption of liberty”: Under “Barnett’s Republican 
Constitution . . . [r]ather than treating legislation as presumptively 
constitutional, they must treat the citizen’s challenge as 
presumptively correct.”67 As she acknowledges, however, in this 
book, I say very little about putting the thumb on the scale for the 
citizen against the state: just two paragraphs. Indeed, after a long 
discussion of the lower court opinion in Lee Optical, I note that 
“who bears the formal burden of proof may be less important for 
preserving the sovereignty of the people than that courts 
realistically assess the rationality and arbitrariness, even if the 
legislature is given the benefit of the doubt” (p. 243). 
Given the professed sympathy of modern law professors for 
so-called “legal realism,” ironically, in my book I am merely 
advocating realism over formalism. I am skeptical that the legal 
realists were really all that interested in realism. In the end, as 
soon as they had the votes, they replaced realist “Brandeis briefs” 
with a formal presumption of constitutionality, which eventually 
was deemed to be irrebuttable, and therefore ceased to be a true 
“presumption.” 
In my jaundiced opinion, assertions of “realism” and 
“restraint” were merely useful arguments to advance the 
progressive political agenda of the Legal Realists. Likewise, 
today’s progressives are interested in “judicial restraint” and 
deference to the majoritarian branches only when the laws they 
like are being challenged as unconstitutional. 
Like others, Barrett refers to my approach as “libertarian,”68 
yet all I am asking for is realism. If such realism cuts in a 
“libertarian” direction, then that is more a reflection on 
 
 67. Barrett, supra note 50, at 62. 
 68. Barrett, supra note 50, at 76 (referring to “Barnett’s generally libertarian 
approach”). 
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c 
legislatures and what they are “really” up to most of the time than 
it is on my priors. 
SANFORD LEVINSON 
While it was still in manuscript, I delivered talks on my book 
at Yale and Harvard. Jack Balkin commented on my book at 
Yale, and Sandy Levinson commented at Harvard. Both Balkin 
and Levinson expressed objections to my use of the term 
“republican,” saying pretty much what they now say in greater 
depth in their contributions to this symposium. Having responded 
to Balkin’s objection above, let me now further elaborate in 
response to Levinson’s. 
Progressives are highly possessive of the term “republican.” 
Around the time of the bicentennial they relished the historical 
claim that the Founders were more communitarian and less 
“liberal” than most Americans then believed. And they did so 
under the rubric “civic republicanism.” Balkin’s paper presents 
the relevant literature, and I am not in a position to challenge that 
historiography. I do recall, however, that when I read Gordon 
Wood’s Creation of the American Republic, it was my impression 
that many of the quotes he included in the footnotes did not 
completely align with the characterizations in the text.  
So I was not at all surprised that my use of the term 
“republican” would raise some hackles among those who felt they 
had trademarked the term. And in the final version of the book, I 
responded to this objection with a defense of my using the term 
“republican,” in contrast with the term “democratic.”69 A portion 
of this defense is so basic that it could be characterized as 
syllogistic: 
In his book, Our Undemocratic Constitution, Levinson 
insisted that the U.S. Constitution is “undemocratic”; 
In my book, I explain how the Founders quite consciously 
rejected the forms of state governments as “too 
democratic”; 
The Founders called their “undemocratic” constitution 
“republican”; 
 
 69. See pp. 26–28 (section discussing “Reclaiming the Label ‘Republican’”). 
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Ergo, it is fair of me to call the U.S. Constitution 
“republican” in contrast with a democratic constitution 
of the sort that Levinson favors. 
 
It is really that simple. Levinson’s beef is with the Founders who 
called their newfangled “undemocratic” constitution 
“republican”—not with me. 
In responding to Balkin’s objection above, I defended my 
claim that identifying the Constitution as republican because it 
was undemocratic is fair. So let me now move on to the substance 
of Levinson’s critique, which perhaps is more accurately called a 
“list of grievances.” I can only consider a few. 
Levinson disputes my historiography of the Republican 
Party: 
His version of the Republican Party—and, therefore, a 
constitution ostensibly identified with that Party—requires 
that he ruthlessly ignore or dismiss not only a number of 
contemporary differences between the two parties with regard 
to the liberties they emphasize (or choose to ignore), but also 
the views of many officials elected over time under the 
Republican banner.70 
This charge is in tension, however, with his acknowledging 
that I label Republican Teddy Roosevelt a progressive and that 
“readers may be surprised to discover” from my book “that 
Herbert Hoover was also a dangerous progressive.”71 To this he 
adds the entirely accurate description of Republican Robert Bork 
as adhering to the stance I call the Democratic Constitution, as 
did John Roberts. Of course, I make clear throughout the book 
that many Republicans have long accepted the Democratic 
Constitution, and were also progressives. That was the point of 
my discussion of Roosevelt and Hoover. Indeed, the 
“progressive” and “democratic” judicial philosophy of 
Republicans Bork and Roberts is the principal target of my book! 
Of course, if readers are surprised to read that Hoover was a 
progressive, it is because he has for so long been demonized as a 
laissez-faire “conservative.” As Levinson concedes, “One can 
certainly argue that [Hoover] has been unfairly typecast as a 
 
 70. Sanford Levinson, Randy Barnett’s Critique of Democracy (and John Marshall?), 
32 CONST. COMMENT. 113, 118 (2016). 
 71. Id. at 119. 
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simple-mindedly reactionary villain jousting against the heroic 
Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal.”72 Indeed. In a book for a 
popular audience, counteracting that “typecasting” is an 
important step in developing an alternate narrative. 
My alternative narrative is one that seeks to counter balance 
the narrative to which the general audience at whom this book is 
aimed is unrelentingly subjected today in both schools and in the 
popular culture. Not only do today’s readers need to be reminded 
that Roosevelt and Hoover were progressive Republicans who 
adhered to the Democratic Constitution and appointed justices 
like Republican Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., they need to be 
reminded just how egregiously wrong were the Nineteenth-
century Progressives, with whom latter-day Progressives so 
proudly identify.73 
Today’s readers also need reminding 
that the Republican Party was founded in opposition to 
the democratic vision of majoritarian “popular 
sovereignty” advanced by the Democratic Party in 
defense of slavery in the territories; 
that it was the Republican Congress which repeatedly 
passed civil rights acts in the 1860s and 70s, which were 
then nullified by majoritarian Republican-nominated 
justices; 
that it was a Republican, Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
who dissented from these decisions; 
that it was Republican administrations who continued to 
enforce the laws that remained on the books until the 
election of Democrat President Grover Cleveland; 
that progressive Democrat Woodrow Wilson segregated 
the federal government by race; and 
that a Republican President, Dwight Eisenhower, 
nominated a Republican Governor, Earl Warren, to be 
Chief Justice. 
To this list of reminders, I might also have added that it was 
a Republican President who sent federal troops to Little Rock to 
enforce the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings against a 
 
 72. Id. at 120. 
 73. See THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS, AND 
AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (2016). 
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recalcitrant Democratic governor; that Martin Luther King, like 
most blacks then, was a Republican; and that, due to opposition 
by Democrats, the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s would not have 
passed without Republican support in Congress; indeed, that such 
measures garnered a higher proportion of Republican than 
Democratic support. The voting breakdown by party was: 
 
The original House version: 
Democratic Party: 152–96 (61–39%) 
Republican Party: 138–34 (80–20%) 
 
Cloture in the Senate: 
Democratic Party: 44–23 (66–34%) 
Republican Party: 27–6 (82–18%) 
 
The Senate version: 
Democratic Party: 46–21 (69–31%) 
Republican Party: 27–6  (82–18%) 
 
The Senate version, voted on by the House: 
Democratic Party: 153–91  (63–37%) 
Republican Party: 136–35  (80–20%)74 
 
Perhaps none of this is news to academic readers of this 
scholarly article.75 But do these readers present these facts to their 
students when conveying their narratives in class or in their 
writings? Not when I was a law student, they didn’t, and I doubt 
any but a few do today. 
I can assure Levinson that most readers of my book are well 
aware of the self-congratulatory stance that today’s Democrats 
 
 74.  See DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE 
US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 311 n.1 (1995). 
 75. On the crucial role that Republicans played in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, see 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 121 
(2014) (“Liberal Democrats could not supply the sixty-seven votes needed to stop the 
filibuster [by southern Democrats] without Republican support; only Dirksen, the party’s 
leader in the Senate, could supply the extra votes for the requisite supermajority.”). 
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take towards the role some Democrats played in securing passage 
of the Civil Rights acts of the 1960s, dismissing Democrat 
opponents of such measures as “Dixiecrats” and highlighting the 
opposition to the passage of the 1964 Act by Republicans such as 
Barry Goldwater. In my book, I offer these countervailing facts, 
not to make Republicans heroes but to provide a “republican 
narrative” that modern-day Republicans can and should embrace. 
As the title of his essay suggests, Levinson contends that my 
real target is not the Progressives but John Marshall. And I admit 
that, after Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Marshall is among my least 
favorite justices. But, while I cannot contest modern historians’ 
claims about civic republicanism, I can contest the Progressives’ 
claims merely to be following the lead of “the Great Chief 
Justice.”76 They have accomplished this by selectively reading out 
of the Marshall opinions the parts that Levinson complains I 
quote. 
So in his reply, he reiterates the famous parts of Marshall’s 
opinions that law professors stress. To his credit, he concedes: “It 
is not that one cannot read McCulloch more restrictively.”77 But 
this restrictive reading, he insists, “is not in fact the message that 
has been drawn from the case over its now almost-200-year 
history.”78 And he is “quite confident that it is idiosyncratic in the 
extreme to read McCulloch as a case whose central meaning is in 
fact the limitations on the powers of the national government.”79 
Levinson then reiterates the expansively-worded passages of 
Gibbons that law professors have long emphasized: The 
commerce power of Congress extends to “commerce, which is 
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in 
a state, or between different parts of the same state” if that 
commerce “affect[s] other states” and that “[c]omprehensive as 
the word ‘among’ is, it may very properly be restricted to that 
commerce which concerns more states than one.”80 
Levinson concludes his exegesis of McCulloch and Gibbons 
by accusing me of “construct[ing] a fictitious history of unbroken 
constitutional fidelity” by failing “to recognize the responsibility 
of Marshall himself for the [capacious] constitutional vision 
 
 76. Levinson, supra note 70, at 132. 
 77. Id. at 134. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 137 (his emphasis). 
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that . . . Marshall instantiated.”81 Oh, I recognize it all right. Both 
McCulloch, Gibbons, and Marshall himself are grist for my mill in 
Restoring the Lost Constitution.82 
Yet the point I make in Our Republican Constitution is that 
neither case goes as far as the Progressives maintained when they 
used these opinions of the Great Chief Justice to assert their 
fidelity to the written Constitution. Indeed, as I noted above,83 this 
was the publicly-expressed view of John Marshall when defending 
himself from the charge that McCulloch was latitudinarian. 
Seriously, if Gibbons plus McCulloch were really taken at the 
time to have been as “capaciously” read as the Progressives later 
claimed—and Levinson still claims—about the scope of federal 
power, would there have been any need for the Thirteenth 
Amendment? Would not Congress have had the power to abolish 
the economic activity of slavery “which is completely internal, 
which is carried on between man and man in a state,” for surely 
this commerce “concerned more states than one” and “affect[ed] 
other states?”84 
Yet, to my knowledge, even the most creative antislavery 
lawyers—including my own personal favorites Lysander Spooner 
and Salmon Chase—did not imagine Congress had such a power, 
much less that Gibbons and McCulloch had already so ruled!85 
True, some employed the precedent of Story’s egregious (and 
very modernly-reasoned) reading of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in Prigg v. Pennsylvania86 to contend that Congress had a 
sweeping power to enforce various rights guarantees in the 
original Constitution on behalf of slaves. 
For example, Joel Tiffany relied on Prigg in support of his 
contention that “all the rights and immunities guaranteed by the 
Constitution to the citizen of the United States, can be secured by 
 
 81. Id. at 138. 
 82. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 171–80 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing McCulloch); id. at 294–97 
(discussing Gibbons). 
 83. See supra text accompanying notes 8–12. 
 84. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194–95 (1824). 
 85. See Randy E. Barnett, The Continuing Relevance Of The Original Meaning Of 
The Thirteenth Amendment, GEO. J.L. PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2016); Randy E. Barnett, 
Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment 3 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 165 (2011) (chronicling the arguments that antislavery constitutionalists 
did make). 
 86. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
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the Federal Government, and for this end they have a right to pass 
all the laws necessary for the enforcement of those guarantys.”87 
But I know of no antislavery constitutionalist who thought Prigg 
was a defensible extension of McCulloch, or that either case 
justified Congress to use its commerce power to prohibit slavery 
within a state. 
Even after emancipating most of the slaves in a variety of 
ways and winning the Civil War, the most radical Republicans in 
Congress did not believe they had a power to abolish slavery 
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. In 
James Oakes’ extensive examination of the myriad legislative 
devices employed by Republicans to restrict slavery prior to the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the commerce power is not even 
mentioned.88 To gain the power that past and present Progressives 
claim already existed, Republicans believed a constitutional 
amendment was both necessary and worth fighting strenuously 
for. 
Indeed in the wake of the Civil War, the Chase court adhered 
to what I have contended was the original meaning of the 
Commerce Clause.89 But if the Republicans and the Chase Court 
were right, then the Progressives were wrong, and remain wrong. 
And so too is Levinson wrong to claim an “almost-200-year” 
pedigree for the Progressives’ reading of Gibbons and McCulloch 
that renders mine “idiosyncratic in the extreme.” While I am quite 
prepared to take on the bitter of John Marshall’s loosey goosey  
opinions  and to criticize  him for  it, I am entitled to quote the 
sweet parts of these canonical cases—even the parts that don’t fit 
the narrative of the “New Deal Constitution.” 
Like Barrett and Mazzone, Levinson seems to be imputing 
what he knows are my libertarian politics and policy preferences 
 
 87. JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN 
SLAVERY: TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
IN RELATION TO THAT SUBJECT 100 (1849); see also id. at 138–41. 
 88. See JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1861–1865 (2013). 
 89. See U.S. v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 43–44 (1869) (invalidating a lamp oil 
prohibition as beyond both the taxing and commerce powers of Congress) (“[T]his express 
grant of power to regulate commerce among the States has always been understood as 
limited by its terms; and as a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade 
and business of the separate States; except, indeed, as a necessary and proper means for 
carrying into execution some other power expressly granted or vested.” (emphasis added)). 
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to what I am claiming that courts should do. But, in what is 
probably my favorite passage of his essay, he says: 
No attractive world would come to an end if courts were more 
inclined to monitor such patent rent-seeking in circumstances 
where the assertion of a public purpose is implausible (even if 
not outright “lunatic” as presumably required by the most 
austere version of “minimum rationality”).90 
I entirely agree with this. Both ideally and in practice, most 
laws and regulations would pass a realistic rationality and 
arbitrariness reviews. Mine is actually a very modest proposal that 
would yield modest results. At its core, it merely requires that 
legislatures exercise their powers in good faith and with a 
modicum of care. Perhaps it is a measure of just how extreme is 
the formalism of today’s “rational basis” review, that even a 
proposal as modestly realist as mine seems radical. 
For me, there is a difference between what is constitutional 
under our Republican Constitution and every particular of what I 
might favor as public policy. I understand how, in a day and age 
in which everything that is “good” must ipso facto be 
constitutional, that might be a difficult claim to credit. Levinson 
asks skeptically: “Is it really the case that Barnett would be 
satisfied to stop with the invalidation of ridiculous laws limiting 
the liberty interests of would-be florists or opticians devoted to 
reducing the prices of duplicate glasses?”91 
If my answer to this question is “yes,” do I win the debate? 
Can I still win if laws that are not “ridiculous” on their face—like 
Hialeah’s ordinance banning animal sacrifice92 or Texas’s 
restrictions on abortion clinics93—turn out, upon examination, to 
be “arbitrary”?  What about laws that may not seem “ridiculous” 
 
 90. Levinson, supra note 70, at 127–28. 
 91. Id. at 128. 
 92. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 561 (1993) 
(citing Michael McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of 
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) (“[A] regulation is not neutral in an 
economic sense if, whatever its normal scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes greater 
costs on religious than on comparable nonreligious activities.”)). 
 93. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2316 (2016) (“[T]his 
record evidence, along with the absence of any evidence to the contrary, provides ample 
support for the District Court’s conclusion that ‘[m]any of the building standards 
mandated by the act and its implementing rules have such a tangential relationship to 
patient safety in the context of abortion as to be nearly arbitrary.’”). 
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/  
when enacted, but come later to be seen as irrationally based on 
prejudice or junk science? 
Many of Levinson’s grievances about my reading of our 
Republican Constitution involve, not a claim that we need to 
impose restrictions on liberty, but claims about the need for 
income redistribution and other uses of the tax and spending 
powers. About these I say nothing in my book. Like my last book, 
Restoring the Lost Constitution, this new one is about restrictions 
on our liberty, or freedom of action—on our ability to do what we 
will with what is ours. I assume that, in our constitutional order, 
general taxation and government spending is constitutional, 
however unlibertarian that may be. As Levinson does to his credit 
with the Second Amendment, I take the Sixteenth Amendment 
as I find it. While elsewhere I do advocate its repeal in favor of a 
national sales tax,94 I do not advocate that judges ignore or 
“interpret” away the text to reach libertarian ends. 
So both because I don’t talk about taxing and spending, and 
because irrationality and arbitrariness review would be rather 
modest in its effects on regulations, Levinson is right when he 
says, “Barnett might complain that I am overestimating the 
degree to which he is a radical individualist.”95 But this is because, 
as already mentioned, there is a difference between how radical 
an individualist I might be as a policy matter, and how I read the 
original meaning of the Constitution we have.96 
Far more “radical” in its effect would be for courts to enforce 
the structural constraints on Congress’s power that Levinson and 
Balkin call “hardwired.” This includes its enumerated powers, as 
well as its power to delegate its legislative powers to the executive 
branch. But even here, this proposal should be more acceptable 
to a small “d” democrat like Levinson than he is prepared to 
acknowledge. 
As he notes with respect to health care laws, limiting the 
power of Congress does not eliminate the power of government. 
It simply says which governments should address a policy 
problem. State governments are government too, and are at least 
as democratic as is the Congress, and arguably far more 
 
 94. See BARNETT, supra note 82, at 416. 
 95. Levinson, supra note 70, at 128. 
 96. See Randy E. Barnett, Is the Constitution Libertarian?, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
9. 
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accountable to their people. On democratic grounds, then, why 
not let Brandeis’s laboratories of regulatory experimentation 
operate there? 
To this, Levinson asserts that federalism provides an 
inadequate check on potentially tyrannical state governments: 
We must take essentially on faith that this capacity for tyranny 
will be adequately limited by the fact that states can compete 
with one another and that relatively random individuals can 
engage in their right to “foot-vote” by declaring they’re mad as 
hell and will not take it anymore as they move to a more 
compatible state.97 
But, under the approach of our Republican Constitution, we 
need not take this on faith. In this part of his article, Levinson 
seems to have forgotten the part of my thesis he criticizes earlier 
in his: that federal courts should police state exercises of their 
police powers by invalidating irrational or arbitrary – and 
therefore “tyrannical”—state regulations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See how coherently our Republican Constitution 
can operate? 
By the same token, on democratic grounds, why does he not 
demand that our elected Congress make its own laws, rather than 
pass vague aspirational policy objectives, and then let unelected, 
unaccountable executive branch regulators make the rules that 
actually bind We the People? If that is too much work for our 535 
servants, then that is all the more reason to let the fifty 
democratically-elected state legislatures in on the action. 
Of course, we all know the answer to why everything must be 
moved to the national level. It is precisely because foot voting by 
individuals and companies is indeed a greater constraint on the 
exercise of government power by states than is “democratic” 
ballot voting at the federal level. 
Moreover, I never proposed to abolish elections—indeed my 
Bill of Federalism proposal for constitutional amendments 
includes a call for term limits.98 You don’t get rotation in office 
without elections. The claims that foot voting is a more effective 
means for individuals to protect their own interests than ballot 
voting, and that, when most power is exercised by competing state 
governments, foot voting provides a more potent check on the 
 
 97. Levinson, supra note 70, at 136. 
 98. See BARNETT, supra note 82, at 415. 
9 - BARNETT_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17  9:11 AM 
2017] A REPLY TO SIX CRITICISMS 241 
 
scope of government power, is not to claim that ballot voting has 
no value at all. As I say in the Introduction, “those who hold a 
republican or individualist vision of popular sovereignty will 
acknowledge that popular elections provide a vital constraint on 
the exercise of power by the agents or servants of the people” (pp. 
25-26). 
The debate is not, therefore, over whether to have elections, 
but over what elections mean.  For adherents to the Democratic 
Constitution, elections express the “will of the people” who are 
entitled to rule. Except in extraordinary circumstances, thwarting 
this majoritarian will is deemed to be illegitimate. The 
problematic nature of allowing unelected, unaccountable, judges 
to invalidate expressions of the will of the people even has its own 
technical name: the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”99 
For adherents to the Republican Constitution, elections 
serve as a vital check on the power of the servants of the people 
by their masters. In agency law, an agent must act on behalf of the 
principal and subject to his or her control.100 Elections provide a 
semblance of such control. But, under a Republican Constitution, 
judges too are servants of the people, whose job it is to fairly 
adjudicate claims made by a jointly-sovereign individual citizen, 
that his or her agents have acted ultra vires or beyond the proper 
scope of their just powers. 
So not only do I embrace elections, as explained above, but 
my proposal that judges fully enforce our Republican 
Constitution’s structural constraints of federalism and separation 
of powers, would result in more decision-making by 
democratically-elected state legislators and fewer by unelected 
federal functionaries in the executive-administrative state.101 
Consequently, if elected legislators in fifty states are making more 
of the laws (subject to the judicial guardrails provided by the 
Fourteenth Amendment), and Congress is stopped by the courts 
from offloading its law-making duties to unelected executive 
branch bureaucrats, there would be more, not less, electoral 
accountability than we have today. 
 
 99. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
 100. See Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 
75 CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1981 (1987). 
 101. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE UNLAWFUL? (2014) 
(criticizing the prerogative powers of the executive administrative state). 
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So, for a true democrat like Sandy Levinson, what’s not to 
like? 
LAWRENCE SOLUM 
I have already noted Larry Solum’s defense of my project 
against critics who may accuse it of historical inaccuracy when 
employing the label “republican.” Like Monsieur Jourdain’s 
discovery that he had “been speaking prose all my life, and didn’t 
even know it,”102 I now discover that I have been engaged in 
“metalinguistic contestation” without realizing it. 
But this was just a preface to his article presenting “a 
republican theory of constitutionalism” that “explains the ways in 
which republican virtue and republican liberty might provide a 
normatively attractive constitutional vision that supplements, 
extends, and enriches the vision offered in Our Republican 
Constitution.”103 In his rich essay, Solum defends the following 
propositions. 
Republican liberty requires that society be organized in 
such a way that individuals and their communities will 
flourish; hence, peace and prosperity are perquisites for 
freedom. 
Republican liberty requires that society be organized in 
such a way that individuals develop the capacity for self-
government; the formation of virtuous character should 
be a central aim of legislation, especially in the realm of 
the family and the educational system. 
Republican liberty requires the creation of conditions 
under which individuals can become economically self-
reliant and independent of others, masters of their own 
lives, and not depend on either government or a private 
entity to the degree that they become mastered by 
others.104 
As someone with an Aristotelian-Thomist background and 
bent, I am quite attracted to his account. In the limited space I 
have here, I cannot provide a full evaluation of its merits, but wish 
to stress one point in particular. We hear a lot about “self-
government” by those who adhere to the Democratic 
 
 102. MOLIÈRE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN. 
 103. Solum, supra note 31, at 182. 
 104. Id. at 199. 
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Constitution. For it is supposedly by elections and referenda that 
“the people govern themselves.” However, as I have contended 
in both Our Republican Constitution and Restoring the Lost 
Constitution, this is a myth and a potentially pernicious one. 
For, in the name of “self-government,” the Democratic 
Constitution licenses the exercise of power by a majority of a 
handful of individuals designated “legislators” and even, in our 
current system, the faceless individual bureaucrats to whom these 
“legislators” have delegated their powers. Because an individual 
can consent to nearly anything—from entering a boxing ring to 
having sex with another person—when it is fictitiously claimed 
that you have to have consented to delegate power to a group of 
strangers, these strangers can then assert this faux-consent to 
justify their authority to do pretty much anything to you that they 
like. Consent is simply too powerful a mechanism to be fictitiously 
allocated to others. 
Solum correctly distinguishes this collective conception of 
self-government from the Republican conception of “self-
governance” as literally the government of one’s own self: 
“Republican constitutionalism emphasizes government of the 
individual by the individual.”105 That is what individual 
sovereignty means. 
As I explain in The Structure of Liberty, natural rights define 
the boundaries within which persons should be free to make their 
own choices—to truly govern themselves—subject to the like 
liberty of their fellow citizens and joint sovereigns.106 Or as Solum 
puts it: “For a republican constitution on Barnett’s account, the 
fundamental institutions of self-government are judicially-
enforceable, liberty-protecting rights and institutional 
arrangements of executive and legislative power that aim to 
minimize the rights violations and thereby preserve individual 
self-government.”107 
How one should live his or her own life within these 
boundaries is not a political question, but a moral or ethical one. 
(The 1960s leftie catch phrase “the personal is political” denies 
this.) The Aristotelian natural law conception of the virtues 
 
 105. Id. at 186. 
 106. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 15 (2d ed. 2014) (“[N}atural law ethics purports to instruct us on how to exercise the 
liberty that is defined and protected by natural rights.”). 
 107. Solum, supra note 31, at 186. 
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instructs how one is to exercise the liberty that natural rights 
defines. The Aristotelian conception of vices instructs us on what 
behavior to avoid. 
For an Aristotelian, however, the matter of virtue and vice is 
not merely a way of behaving. It is a way of being. To be virtuous 
is to habituate the virtues so they become, as it were, one’s 
“second nature.” For example, most of us do not refrain from 
shoplifting because we see a security camera or fear being caught 
and punished. For most of us, the very idea of shoplifting never 
enters our thoughts. We have been habituated to respecting the 
rights of others to the degree that violating another’s rights is not 
even considered an option. 
Of course, there is a minority of law-abiding persons who 
must consciously consider and reject the option of shop-lifting 
each time they enter a store. While such persons are to be 
commended for their behavior—indeed their self-restraint 
requires far greater self-control on their part than if respecting the 
rights of others had become their “second nature”—they are not 
virtuous. If they were, the decision to refrain from shoplifting 
would require no effort at all, since the very idea would not even 
be present in their thoughts as an option. 
But habituating one’s self to act virtuously and avoid vice 
requires years of practice. The same holds for how one treats 
others morally in ways that do not violate their rights. Is one kind, 
generous, honest (though not to a fault), caring, empathetic, or 
considerate of their feelings? All these describe how a truly 
virtuous person would behave without thinking much about it. 
One implication of this approach to self-governance is that to 
live virtuously, to pursue happiness in the truest sense, is a do-it-
yourself affair. Virtue is an internal state and cannot be 
commanded by others. I do not deny that compelling others to act 
as they should might cause some to become virtuous out of habit. 
But it can have the opposite effect on others. 
As the great Aristotelian-Thomist philosopher—and my 
mentor—Henry Veatch explained: 
[N]o human being ever attains his natural end or perfection 
save by his own personal effort and exertion. No one other than 
the human individual—no agency of society, of family, of 
friends, or of whatever can make or determine or program an 
individual to be a good man, or  live the life that a human being 
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ought to live. Instead attaining one’s natural end as a human 
person is nothing if not a “do-it-yourself” job.108 
Veatch readily acknowledged “that one can be helped in a 
variety of ways in attaining one’s natural perfection. Friends, 
family, the various institutions of society—even good fortune—
can all contribute mightily to a person’s attaining his goal or 
natural end.”109 Nevertheless, however, “the actual business of 
attaining the end—living wisely and intelligently—is something 
that only the individual can do.”110 (I might mention that Henry 
was no political conservative or libertarian, but was a 
conventional liberal Democrat.) 
It does no good to undermine the necessary prerequisite to 
the pursuit of happiness that is the individual liberty defined by 
our natural rights to provide the other material goods that 
happiness also requires. A well-crafted system of private 
property, freedom of contract, self-defense, and restitution 
secures that liberty.111 If a free market system is not enough to 
provide material well-being by means of  voluntary exchanges 
that also benefit others as well as oneself—or by means of private 
charity—these ways to acquire material goods can be 
supplemented by tax and spending programs. 
As mentioned briefly above, I freely acknowledge that, under 
our Republican Constitution, government has the power to tax 
and spend; and I distinguish this from its power to regulate 
rightful and prohibit wrongful behavior. Further, I assume that 
the use of the tax and spending powers to redistribute wealth is 
constitutional—at least at the state level.112 But such a system 
 
 108. HENRY B. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? 84 (1985). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 84–85. For more on Veatch’s account of Aristotelian ethics, see HENRY B. 
VEATCH, RATIONAL MAN: A MODERN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS 
(2003); see also HENRY B. VEATCH, ARISTOTLE: A CONTEMPORARY APPRECIATION 
(1974) (explicating Aristotelian philosophy more generally). 
 111. See generally BARNETT, supra note 106 (defending the social function and 
necessity of these fundamental rights). 
 112. As Sandy Levinson notes in his paper, the debate over whether federal tax 
revenues can be spent for purposes or objects that are not enumerated in the Constitution 
dates back to the debates between Hamilton and the federalists, and their republican 
opponents on the constitutionality of so-called “public improvements.” See Levinson, 
supra note 70, at 138 (discussing Madison’s veto of a federal public improvements act on 
the ground that it was unconstitutional). See also Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare 
Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 
(2003). But, once again, this is not a debate over whether government can tax and spend 
for this purpose but which government in our federal system is empowered to do so. 
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must be designed and administered with great care, lest it actually 
be counterproductive. 
In discussing the role that virtue plays in the pursuit of 
happiness—and the nature of virtue—I have perhaps said too 
much on a subject about which I claim no professional expertise. 
But to fully appreciate the reasons why the individual popular 
sovereignty that recognizes and protects individual self-
governance is a vital means to the end of a free and virtuous 
people, it is worth at least identifying this approach to virtuous 
self-governance. 
True, although such individual sovereignty is necessary to the 
pursuit of happiness, it is not sufficient to its attainment. But 
whatever else may be required must be achieved consistently with 
the individual sovereignty or “republican liberty,” without which 
virtue and happiness are impossible. 
Which is yet another reason to favor our Republican 
Constitution that is based on the sovereignty of We the People, 
each and every one. 
